Institutional mechanisms to keep unburnable fossil fuel reserves in the soil by Pellegrini, L. (Lorenzo) et al.
Energy Policy 149 (2021) 112029
Available online 20 November 2020
0301-4215/© 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Policy Perspective 
Institutional mechanisms to keep unburnable fossil fuel reserves in the soil 
Lorenzo Pellegrini a,b,*, Murat Arsel a,b, Martí Orta-Martínez b,c,d, Carlos F. Mena b, 
Gorka Muñoa d 
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A B S T R A C T   
To limit the probable increase in global mean temperature to 2 ◦C, about 80%, 50% and 30% of existing coal, gas 
and oil reserves, respectively, would need to remain under the soil. While the concept of ‘unburnable fuels’ has 
become prominent, there has been little discussion on institutional mechanisms to identify specific fossil fuel 
reserves to be left untouched and the financial mechanisms for raising and distributing funds to compensate the 
right-holders for forgoing extraction. We present an auction mechanism to determine the fossil fuel reserves to be 
kept untapped – those whose extraction would generate the least rents, ensuring cost efficiency. The auctions 
could be complemented by other provisions to reap collateral benefits of avoided extraction, for example by 
prioritizing reserves that coincide with outstanding socio-environmental values that are likely to be disrupted by 
the extraction of fossil fuels. We also discuss how to raise funds, for example through a fossil fuel producers-based 
tax, to finance the mechanism compensating right-holders and ensuring commitment. The effective identification 
of unburnable fossil fuel reserves and the development of accompanying funding mechanisms seems to be the 
elephant in the room of climate negotiations and we aim at contributing to an overdue discussion on supply-side 
interventions to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions.   
‘Keep fossil fuels in the ground.’ 
People’s Demands for Climate Justice, signed by 295,000+ people 
and 403 organisations, 2020 
‘Yet amid the clamour is a single, jarring truth. Demand for oil is 
rising and the energy industry […] is planning multi-trillion-dollar 
investments to satisfy it. No firm embodies this strategy better than 
ExxonMobil, the giant that rivals admire and green activists love to 
hate … [I]t plans to pump 25% more oil and gas in 2025 than in 
2017. If the rest of the industry pursues even modest growth, the 
consequence for the climate could be disastrous.’ 
(The Economist, 2019) 
1. Introduction: unburnable fossil fuel reserves 
Approximately 80%, 50% and 30% of existing coal, gas and oil 
reserves, respectively, would need to remain under the soil in order to 
limit the probable increase in global mean temperature to 2 ◦C (Leaton, 
2012; McGlade and Ekins, 2015). Even more ambitious targets would be 
necessary to limit it to 1.5 ◦C to comply with the commitments made 
under the Paris Agreement (Allen et al., 2019). The implications of 
leaving untapped such large portions of existing reserves on the assets of 
energy companies have hit the headlines globally (Griffin et al., 2015) 
and prompted a discussion on ‘unburnable fuels’ (e.g. Bos and Gupta, 
2017; Jakob and Hilaire, 2015; The Economist, 2013). Despite their 
potential significance, however, only recently has there been a surge in 
interest on supply-side climate policy. Several studies have focused 
primarily in making the case of supply-side initiatives (e.g. Asheim et al., 
2019; Burke and Fishel 2020; Lazarus and van Asselt, 2018; Lazarus 
et al., 2020) and a number of compelling proposals on how to enact 
supply-side climate policies are also beginning to be made (e.g. Newell 
and Simms 2019; Pye et al., 2020). This paper aims to contribute to this 
literature by discussing how to identify reserves to leave untapped and 
how to create the necessary financing mechanism. 
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In terms of identifying reserves of unburnable fuels, rather than 
focusing on the spatially explicit distribution of reserves at the conti-
nental scale (McGlade and Ekins, 2015), or for limited areas such as the 
Amazon Basin (Codato et al., 2019), this article proposes a novel 
mechanism built around a reverse auction model to identify the specific 
reserves that can be left unextracted. Regarding the financing of the 
mechanism, it highlights several complementary ideas that seek to 
combine concerns of ecological sustainability with global social justice. 
Before attending to these issues, the next section describes the potential 
strengths of a supply-side initiative, especially when used in conjunction 
with demand-side measures. 
2. Supply-side intervention to complement demand-side 
measures 
The overwhelming majority of climate policy efforts have so far been 
focused on abating greenhouse gas emissions by diminishing con-
sumption and, as a consequence, demand in the global fossil fuels 
market. However, several reasons suggest that demand-side and supply- 
side interventions could be complementary. First, having two sets of 
policies will reduce carbon leakage. According to the logic of inter-
country ‘carbon leakage’ (Babiker, 2005), decreasing demand makes 
fossil fuels cheaper and encourages countries that do not have binding 
commitments to consume more, in part offsetting the effect of demand 
policies. Leakage can also be intertemporal and create a ‘green paradox’ 
where the perspective of reduced global consumption of fossil fuels 
generates an incentive for producing countries to extract as much and as 
fast as possible to generate rents before the demand for fossil fuels de-
clines (Eichner and Pethig, 2011; Sinn, 2009). A similar dynamic is 
possible with supply-side policies: when fossil fuels are left unextracted 
in one country, global supply experiences a contraction, resulting in a 
marginal increase in price and making it more profitable for other 
countries to extract more – a supply-side leakage. Implementing supply 
and demand mitigation policies in conjunction would synergize and 
improve each other’s effectiveness by counterbalancing price-effects 
and decreasing leakage. 
A related issue is the acceptability of supply-side climate policies, if 
compared to demand-side policies, for fossil fuel interests. Effective 
demand-side policies decrease the consumption of fossil fuels and 
reduce their prices across the board, which motivates the opposition of 
fossil fuel interests to such policies. Supply-side policies would have no 
such effect on prices and the proposal discussed here (reducing supply 
through compensation) would create winners as well as losers among 
fossil fuel interests. The former would include right-holders who see 
their resources becoming scarcer and, as a consequence, global prices of 
their products and assets higher, while the latter would include the 
downstream industry that would process a lower amount of products. 
The heterogeneity of the effect of supply policies over the fossil fuel 
industry would undermine any monolithic front against them. 
Moreover, having two sets of policies might work as insurance in 
case one set would not be implemented effectively, increasing the 
credibility of both (Asheim et al., 2019). Similarly, a supply-side inter-
vention would add an element of concreteness to climate policies based 
on widespread reductions of consumption (Green, 2018). Additionally, 
instituting a supply-side policy offers the advantage of low transaction 
costs since it would be much easier to monitor a limited number of point 
supply sources of a commodity if compared to diffuse consumption 
sources of greenhouse gas with uncertain counterfactuals –as discussed 
in the extensive literature on emission accounting (e.g. Searchinger 
et al., 2009). Furthermore, the object of verification is more concrete 
and easier to monitor if compared to greenhouse gas emissions (Newell 
and Simms, 2019, p. 5) and could also be performed through remote 
sensing (Facchinelli et al., 2020). Monitoring of compliance can also be 
supported by civil society actors, such as non-governmental organiza-
tions and social movements. Growing and increasingly more effective 
community based monitoring systems and citizen science practices 
which are currently focused on ensuring the compliance of oil producers 
with corporate social responsibility and environmental protection re-
quirements (e.g. Mena et al., 2020) could be repurposed toward moni-
toring non-extraction. 
3. Reverse auctions, climate change mitigation and collateral 
benefits 
Numerous mechanisms could be put in place to enable the conser-
vation of fossil fuel reserves, ranging from command and control in-
struments (e.g. requiring state authorities to identify and protect 
unburnable fuel reserves) to market-based instruments (e.g. leveraging 
on the allocation of property rights and voluntary-based trading, or 
production taxes) (Lazarus et al., 2015). Here we discuss a hybrid in-
strument, which combines elements of both which, under certain con-
ditions, would be cost-efficient and could be coupled with strategies to 
reap collateral benefits of fossil fuel conservation.1 Cost efficiency is 
realized when a policy objective is achieved in the least costly manner 
possible; a mechanism that relies on a carefully regulated market-based 
mechanism to leave fossil fuel reserves unexploited could deliver cost 
efficiency by keeping the desired level of fossil fuel reserves untapped 
and minimizing the expenditure to compensate the right-holders. In the 
case of fossil fuels, the identity of the right-holders will depend on the 
domestic legal framework that assigns property rights to subsoil re-
sources and the legal system of concessions (Campbell, 1956). In most 
legal systems subsoil rights are held by the state unless there are 
concession rights –the USA being a notable exception among the major 
fossil fuel producers.2 
An institutional mechanism to keep fossil fuel reserves in the soil 
could include the construction of a voluntary framework where the 
holders of rights over (proved, probable and possible) commercially 
viable fossil fuel reserves would obtain compensation for forgoing their 
right to extract them. The compensation amounts could be set through a 
reverse auction where the right-holder participates to secure a payment 
against the commitment of non-exercising extraction rights (e.g. Ray 
et al., 2011). Competitive bidding would then be the mechanism to elicit 
the desirable amount of fossil fuels that will not be extracted for the 
lowest possible amount of compensation. This mechanism is akin to the 
common public procurement practice where bidders compete to provide 
specified services or goods and the lowest bid is the one securing the 
contract. The bidding system would guarantee that expenditures on 
compensation are kept to a minimum and that the right-holders over 
reserves whose potential to generate rents is the lowest are the ones that 
accept lower bids. The rent in this instance has to be understood as the 
net value generated by the extraction of fossil fuels. Thus, lower rents 
would be associated with reserves of lower quality, situated in remote 
locations or, more generally, of lower market value and/or costlier to 
extract, transport and process. 
The argument that market-based instruments, including reverse 
auction mechanisms, are cost-efficient and can achieve socially desir-
able results is based on numerous assumptions related to perfect mar-
kets. However, given pervasive market failures with respect to extractive 
1 The instrument presented here is compatible with other policy instruments 
and could be hybridized in different ways, for example by matching auctions 
with taxation as discussed in Section 4.  
2 In terms of mitigation, paying resource owners to forgo extraction would be 
equivalent to purchasing property rights. However, while paying resource 
owners to forgo extraction would entail a substantial diminution of their 
property rights (withdrawal and alienation rights; Schlager and Ostrom, 1992), 
acquiring the property rights tout court would transfer ownership (and the 
associated bundles of rights) over the resource. From an institutional perspec-
tive, the latter solution might be more complex to implement, because of 
(constitutional) limitations to the transfer of ownership of the subsoil that are 
present in many legal frameworks (Campbell, 1956). 
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industries in general, and fossil fuels in particular, the price mechanism 
by itself is unlikely to provide sound economic incentives to achieve 
socially desirable outcomes beyond climate change mitigation. This is 
because rents generated by extractive industries are not affected by the 
socio-environmental costs created by extractive operations – they are 
externalities. These costs are exemplified by extraction operations 
interfering with indigenous territories inhabited by people in voluntary 
isolation and coinciding with globally relevant biodiversity hotspots 
(Finer et al., 2008). More generally, fossil fuel industries are associated 
with the generation of waste, deforestation, oil spills and numerous 
cases of socio-environmental conflict, just to mention a few of the im-
pacts, and market mechanisms alone are notoriously ill-suited to guide 
the allocation of resources in such contexts (Bromley, 2007; Muradian 
et al., 2013; Orta-Martínez et al., 2018). 
It follows that a hybrid mechanism might be preferable and the 
reverse auctions proposed here could be adjusted to accommodate also 
non-monetary values. By creating incentives for keeping specific fossil 
fuel reserves underground, the mechanism would offer the opportunity 
to generate collateral benefits by incorporating socio-environmental 
values into the decision to preserve specific reserves. For example, the 
auctions could be implemented incrementally, beginning with reserves 
that coincide with specific socio-environmental values. Fig. 1 exem-
plifies the overlap of global fossil-fuel distribution with biodiversity 
hotspots. For instance, the first compensation auctions might include 
only fossil fuel reserves that coincide with biodiversity hotspots and the 
extra costs associated with limiting the supply of actionable reserves 
would be countervailed by the conservation of globally relevant biodi-
versity values. This incremental approach could also be practical in view 
of the time needed to generate sufficient funds to keep the necessary 
amount of existing fossil fuel reserves underground. Another option 
would be that reserves coinciding with the specific socio-environmental 
values are subject to a bonus over the value of the reverse auction –i.e. 
the bonus would reflect social value and internalize externalities. 
Additionally, the use of auctions (with or without instruments to 
reap collateral benefits) would be compatible with right-holders 
considering non-monetary motivations to identify unburnable fossil 
fuel reserves. Public authorities might pursue multiple objectives, apart 
from maximizing rents, and could privilege the conservation of fossil 
fuel reserves whose extraction would damage some of these objectives. 
For example, state authorities might want to accept compensation for 
avoiding the exploitation of highly contentious projects or to achieve 
environmental conservation, or both (Pellegrini et al., 2014). Further-
more, the instrument would be compatible and could be combined also 
with other non-market-based instruments, such as non-proliferation 
treaties (Newell and Simms, 2019). For example, a ‘coal elimination 
treaty’ could be implemented, while gas and oil reserves could become 
part of the mechanism outlined here (Burke and Fishel, 2020). 
The main actors into the operation of this market-based mechanism 
would be (national) state agencies, who are in most jurisdictions the 
owners of the resources in question. The involvement of states in the 
functioning of this mechanism would endow it with additional legiti-
macy since it would also circumvent most of the (often legitimate) 
criticisms of market-based environmental policy instruments (Lohmann, 
2011) by separating the pricing process from (corporate) profit motives. 
To the extent that nature would be commodified, this would not purport 
to be the ‘true price’ nor would it involve further transactions. All it 
would do is to articulate a monetary compensation for right-holders who 
agree not to commodify nature through extractive processes and might 
also elicit and compound non-profit-based motives of right-holders 
(Ezzine-de-Blas et al., 2019). 
The possibility of strategic over-estimation of the size of fossil fuel 
reserves is a potential concern. In fact, regardless of climate policies, the 
assessment of reserves lends itself to over-estimation, since the value of 
energy companies is determined (in part) by the size of the reserves they 
control (Misund and Osmundsen, 2017). We would expect similar issues 
in estimating the size of unburnable reserves and reporting and 
disclosure standards similar to those applied in the oil and gas industry 
should be adopted (Bebbington et al., 2019). Alternatively, ad hoc 
methodologies could be developed –like those prototyped by the ‘Fossil 
Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty Initiative’ (Byrnes, 2020). 
4. Funding and commitment 
Establishing the framework to compensate right-holders who forgo 
their extraction rights over fossil fuel reserves will have to be matched 
by mechanisms to generate the necessary funds and address the chal-
lenge of avoiding free-riding in the provision of a global common good 
(Nordhaus, 2015). There are several (complementary) possibilities. 
The concept of ecological debt could be used to assign re-
sponsibilities for the consumption of the global carbon sink (i.e. green-
house gas emissions in the atmosphere) and funding could be collected 
based on accumulated past emissions (Martinez-Alier, 2002). Another 
option would be to collect voluntary contributions into a fund. The 
Yasuní-ITT initiative from Ecuador, for instance, had aimed to combine 
the concept of global ecological debt with a voluntary mechanism to 
keep unexploited oil reserves from a biodiversity hotspot inhabited by 
people in voluntary isolation in the Amazon (Arsel, 2012; Pellegrini 
et al., 2014). Debt-for-nature swaps, which are no longer common, had 
taken a different approach, focusing on the financial debt of developing 
countries and cancelling them out in exchange for conservation com-
mitments (Macekura, 2016). While voluntary funding would face the 
typical free-riding problems of contributing to global commons, it could 
be complementary to other ways to raise funds and, if compared to the 
Yasuní-ITT initiative and debt-for-nature swaps, it would be under-
girded by a multilateral structure providing for a more level playing field 
for negotiation between developing and developed countries. 
An alternative could be to revive and adjust the Daly-Correa tax 
proposal. Based on an idea of Herman Daly that was tabled at OPEC by 
Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa in 2007 (Antón, 2020; Le Quang, 
2016, p. 197), this proposal aimed at creating a mechanism to finance 
climate change adaptation projects in the developing world by insti-
tuting an oil export tax levied by oil producers. In the adjusted version, 
the tax revenues would instead be used to compensate countries that 
forgo their fossil fuel extraction rights. As a consequence, and compared 
to a regime limited to demand-side climate policies, the relative scarcity 
of the remaining reserves would increase as well as, at least in the short 
to medium run, their value and oil-producing countries would be given a 
concrete incentive to support such a tax. 
The details of the institutions overseeing the instrument will have to 
be worked out through negotiations among the participating partners, 
but we anticipate some of the challenges that will be faced. A funda-
mental conundrum accompanying the funding mechanism would be 
that the right-holders, after being compensated for forgoing extraction 
rights, could face the temptation of breaking their promise by keeping 
the compensation and still engaging in extraction activities. The risk 
would be amplified by political cycles and the volatility of fossil fuel 
prices. Therefore, credible commitment instruments should be nested in 
the mechanism. These instruments could include international arbitra-
tion, similarly to the ones routinely included in international investment 
agreements.3 
Alternatively, compensation rights could also be limited to the in-
terest generated by a fund in which the compensation would be 
deposited. The capital in the fund could be withdrawn progressively 
over an extended period of time in a process that would terminate when 
the transition to renewable energy resources is expected to undercut the 
market value of fossil fuels. An intergovernmental structure, such as the 
3 While arbitration has been used most commonly by companies to file claims 
against states, they can be used to enforce contracts between any party. 
Furthermore, proposals for reform include the possibility for states and third 
parties to use arbitration against companies (Pellegrini et al., 2020, p. 467). 
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United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), could be well-suited for 
creating and implementing the necessary structures to ensure mean-
ingful compliance. These could include a trust fund to collect, manage 
and disburse the financial resources and disclosure and verification 
mechanisms to ensure compliance. The specific features of the mecha-
nisms could be lifted from the existing instruments to monitor perfor-
mance and compliance in environmental agreements and from the 
standards of reporting and disclosure of the oil and gas industry (e.g. 
Bebbington et al., 2019). 
5. Conclusion 
The enactment and the effective implementation of a mechanism to 
leave fossil fuel reserves underground undoubtedly faces serious chal-
lenges, both economic and political. In our view, the main economic 
challenge is that mechanisms subtracting fossil fuel reserves from the 
global market might affect the viability of not-yet commercial fossil fuel 
reserves. In fact, fossil fuel reserves are dynamic since the definition of 
‘viable reserves’ depends on market values of fossil fuels and techno-
logical progress (Bp, 2018; Wright and Czelusta, 2004). The imple-
mentation of a mechanism to preserve specific fossil fuel reserves could 
increase the scarcity, and hence the market value, of the remaining re-
serves. That is, there would be a leakage effect and, at the margin, some 
reserves will become commercially viable. This effect might be espe-
cially salient in the short run, since in the medium-to long-run the effect 
would be (partially) countered by a decrease in scarcity as the global 
economy undergoes its transition away from fossil fuels –a process 
accelerated by the mechanism itself. This challenge could be tackled in 
various ways: by simultaneously implementing stringent demand-side 
policies, capping the exploitation of non-viable reserves according to 
current economic and operating conditions, enacting a moratorium on 
oil and gas exploration, or increasing research and development 
spending on renewable energy sources. These could be strings that are 
attached to the joining of the compensation mechanism outlined above. 
While putting a ceiling on existing reserves is going to be complex, since 
the global distribution of oil and gas reserves is concentrated, the 
participation of major producers would be sufficient to guarantee that 
the increase in viable reserves would be just a fraction of the unburnable 
ones. 
A seemingly more insurmountable barrier would the absence of 
political will to create a global institutional mechanism limiting the 
supply of fossil fuels and compensating foregone oil production. How-
ever, climate change has emerged as an issue of global concern and the 
demands of movements such as Extinction Rebellion, Fridays for the 
Future and YASunidos might prove to be harder to ignore in the coming 
years. While it would be a fool’s errand to predict the precise tipping 
point that would render supply-side initiatives more palatable politi-
cally, it would not be far fetched to assert that the present moment is rife 
with possibilities and what appears to be a bold proposal today might 
become reality soon. 
6. Data 
Fig. 1 was elaborated using ArcGIS Desktop 10.6.1 and open-access 
spatial data on a) world oil reserves from United States Geological 
Survey -USGS- [World Petroleum Assessment 20,001, GIS data retrieved 
from: https://certmapper.cr.usgs.gov/data/apps/we-data/; file: 
“wep_prvg.e00 - Geologic Provinces of the World (geographic co-
ordinates)”], b) US oil reserves from the United States Geological Survey 
-USGS- (National Assessment of United States Oil and Gas Resources, 
19,952 and 2012, GIS data retrieved from: https://catalog.data.gov/da 
taset/1995-national-oil-and-gas-assessment-province-boundaries and 
https://catalog.data.gov/dataset/33cfbfa1-1078-4713-aa6a-d2cdc1181 
87d), and c) biodiversity hotspots from the Critical Ecosystem Partner-
ship Fund (https://www.cepf.net/our-work/biodiversity-hotspots/hots 
pots-defined). 
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